The 'Dzvin' failure: reality, a competitor's hit piece, or sabotage?

We are talking about a project that is quite complex to implement, involving system integration services, software development services (specialized software), the supply of standard software (e.g., operating systems, drivers, utilities, libraries, information exchange system modules, etc.), and even the creation of a vehicle capable of transporting communication equipment and ensuring its protection from damage. Therefore, involving multiple contractors is standard practice in the IT business. Journalists can speculate theoretically for a long time on how best to execute IT projects, but specialists do them as required by legal regulations, culture, and project management experience, as well as significant practical experience—not as it might happen in the fantasies of civic activists.

The operational capability of the "Dzvin-AS" automated control system is evidenced by multiple tests during the following events:

• "Kozatska Volia-2018" Command and Staff Exercises (Kyiv, Kramatorsk, Odesa, September 2018);
• Brigade Commanders' Assembly (235th Inter-service Training Center "Shyrokyi Lan", June 2019);
• Bilateral Command and Staff Exercises with the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade and 28th Mechanized Brigade, Operational Command "South" (235th Inter-service Training Center "Shyrokyi Lan", August 2019);
• Experimental operation of 9S701-1R(P) and 9S701-3R units during two-stage Command and Staff Exercises (Operational Command "North" — Mechanized Brigade) (242nd Combined Arms Training Ground, Honcharivske, February 2020);
• Brigade Commanders' Assembly (233rd Combined Arms Training Ground, Nova Liubomyrka, July 2020).

It is worth noting that during the assembly in the summer of 2020, a prototype of a network-centric reconnaissance-strike-fire complex was tested, created on the basis of "Dzvin," "Furia," "Hermes," and "Kropyva." Everything was included in a single system: from the operational-level command body to reconnaissance and fire strike assets. No compatibility issues between the various systems and sensors were detected. The time recorded from target detection by a drone to the first shot of a fire asset was only a few seconds. This system, "Dzvin-AS," is extremely needed by the Armed Forces, and the delay in its delivery to the troops is a highly negative phenomenon for the country's defense capability as a whole.

In the interpretation of the authors of this so-called investigation, cooperation between different business entities is a terrible crime. By roughly the same logic, during a home renovation, it would be a crime to hire a painter, an electrician, and a plumber separately. Everything could be done by the electrician. And if there is a foreman, then that is just a "middleman."

Let us explain for the average citizen: software does not work without hardware—servers, computers. A system (like the "Dzvin" ACS) is a set of information processing, data transmission, and communication tools that ensure the automation of processes for collecting, analyzing, and evaluating the situation, making decisions, planning, conveying these decisions to troops (forces), and monitoring their execution. In this case, we are talking about a batch of fully equipped command and staff vehicles, which the AFU currently lacks. If you look at their cost, the words about a "middleman" no longer look so dramatic. Although this system is built in such a way that it is possible to deploy it with a minimal set of "laptop-radio-generator." It would just be less convenient and efficient.

The necessity of supplying equipment answers the author's question about why "the customer did not sign an agreement directly with these firms that specialize in computer programming, but chose a non-specialized LLC."

LLC "IQusion IT" is an official partner of LLC "Intecracy Base" for software implementation, which is stated on their websites as a competitive advantage. The companies settle payments with each other, and all taxes without exception are paid. What exactly the author "investigated" and what she tried to convey is unclear. Or perhaps the thesis is that enterprises have no right to cooperate at all?

The NGO "Aerorozvidka" was created in 2020. How could the volunteers of the NGO have started the project in 2014? Or does "Delta" also include the functionality of a time machine, like in science fiction movies?

Obviously, there is a simple juggling of words and facts. As open information shows, in 2017, the "Delta" software was transferred to the balance sheet of military unit A2724, not to the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, the software was created at the state's expense by military personnel, not volunteers. Another question is that the "volunteers" (having the status of military personnel with corresponding monetary and other types of support) created their software at state expense, yet registered the copyrights to it personally. And then, with a "grand volunteer gesture," they gave them to the military unit. However, that is another story, although a very interesting one.

Software for decision-making in troop command and for the realization of closed information-calculation tasks for analyzing the use of armed forces at the strategic and operational levels of the AFU does not exist for free sale in the West. This is not surprising—every country builds its own top-level defense strategy with the highest level of state secrecy.

If they exist and can simply be bought, and Mr. Halchynskyi refers to Systematic, then why did he spend several years developing "Delta," which he and his colleagues position as a "system of systems"? Or if the developers are Honchar, Halchynskyi, and other members of "Aerorozvidka," then it is unique and necessary, but if it is someone else, then one should buy a ready-made solution?

However, what one can agree with is that at the tactical level—brigade headquarters and below (which is exactly what "Delta" is intended for), there are quite a few ready-made solutions that could perhaps be adapted for the AFU.

Just for reference:

• As part of American aid, the LifeRing software solution: https://www.agisinc.com/lifering/lifering-solutions/military/
• As part of the supply of Harris tactical radios—a solution for the brigade: https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/rf-5410fc-falconcommand
• As part of the supply of Aselsan tactical radios—a BMS solution for the brigade: https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/command-control-communication-computer-systems/battlefield-management-systems/batur-battle-management-and-unit-tracking-system
• As part of the R&D project "Prostir," Telecard-Prylad is developing an ACS for troop and weapon control for the brigade.

So why did these comrades spend several years "reinventing the wheel," spending state funds? Most likely, "expert" Halchynskyi and the NGO "Aerorozvidka" do not bother with such trifles, nor with explaining the difference between systems for the strategic level and systems for the tactical level. For them, the main thing is "Delta" and the budgets, and where it will be and how, apparently, does not matter.

The word "spotted" is apparently meant to shock the reader—wow, a whole criminal trail! In reality, we are talking about the mention of the company's name in court decision registries, which means absolutely nothing. It is worth reminding that according to the current Criminal Procedure Code, proceedings are opened automatically, simply upon the fact of law enforcement receiving a report, even if it contains only evaluative judgments or nonsense. After an inspection, if no violations are found, the proceedings are also closed automatically. However, in Ukrainian realities, inspections are often delayed, which speaks eloquently about the "health" of the business climate in the country, not about real violations. In this specific case, for several years, investigators have not been able to find facts of legislation violations, nor identify a circle of suspects, and there is no question of transferring the proceedings to court.

What is worth noting, for example, is the report that LLC "Ukrainian Electronics" (which allegedly committed a crime) is connected to LLC "Everest Limited," as well as the companies "IQusion IT" and "Intecracy Base." It is enough to open the registries, which, excuse the tautology, are open, to verify that this information is false.

We provide a quote below from the same article: "...LLC 'IQusion IT' through the company 'Ukrainian Electronics' may be connected to the firm 'Everest Limited'."

So is it connected or may it be? And what is even meant by the word "connected"?

A logical question: if software was being developed, then computer equipment was not supplied, because it was not supposed to be supplied at that stage. "Estimated"—who estimated it? Perhaps there is an expert assessment, and not someone's fantasy about the lack of computer equipment supply in a software development project? And what exactly then are the damages?

The system has a microservice architecture; each service has a documented API, open for application. Based on these interfaces, data exchange protocols are implemented with systems that have already been adopted by the AFU and will be adopted in the future. On what basis did the "expert" even decide that the Ukrainian system would not be able to exchange information with partners or sensors?

The system was created using open-source software. The alleged costs are only a figment of the expert's imagination, whose competence is questionable, while his bias and conflict of interest are not.

It is also worth noting that the "Delta" software itself uses third-party developments with significant license costs. In fact, other developers were accused of their own shortcomings and flaws.

Restrictions exist only when transmitting data between perimeters with different levels of secrecy according to current legislation on information protection. These restrictions are flexibly configured at the system settings level and can change in accordance with changes in legislation, the development, and the application of new technical information protection tools in the system in the future. I will note that the corresponding regulation is defined by governing documents, and the AFU is a hierarchical structure where you simply have to follow orders.

Information is transmitted between command posts instantly or according to pre-established regulations, which are flexibly adjusted to the conditions of communication channel quality, data volume, and the type of information being transmitted. The system has functionality for monitoring transmitted data to ensure the reliable functioning of all levels of command.

As for the delays—it is precisely the actions of Honchar, Halchynskyi, and other "experts" associated with them that lead to the delay in supplying an ACS that is so important for saving the lives of our soldiers.

Information about ADEM first appeared in the audit referred to by the author of the article, from the words of the members of "Aerorozvidka" themselves, and is likely their invention. If data exchange with NATO is meant, then the "Dzvin-AS" software implements a data gateway to the systems of other states in accordance with the NATO standard STANAG 5525 Ed 1 Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM). This is quite an interesting precedent, where an expert invents a problem, accuses others of it, and then argues with himself.

The responses from NATO, which the author of the article refers to, depend on how the questions were formulated. Most likely, the wording was constructed in such a way as to manipulatively obtain the desired answer to stir up a sensation. But even if ADEM had been used, it would not have been a big problem or an issue at all. For example, this specification is used by the Combat Vision project, created in cooperation with the same "Aerorozvidka."

How did it happen that the topic of NATO standards becomes a topic of double standards?